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in competitive and non‑competitive 
environments using Lempel–Ziv 
complexity
Alice Wong1,2,4, Garance Merholz1,7 & Uri Maoz1,2,3,5,6*
The human ability for random‑sequence generation (RSG) is limited but improves in a competitive 
game environment with feedback. However, it remains unclear how random people can be during 
games and whether RSG during games can improve when explicitly informing people that they must 
be as random as possible to win the game. Nor is it known whether any such improvement in RSG 
transfers outside the game environment. To investigate this, we designed a pre/post intervention 
paradigm around a Rock‑Paper‑Scissors game followed by a questionnaire. During the game, we 
manipulated participants’ level of awareness of the computer’s strategy; they were either (a) not 
informed of the computer’s algorithm or (b) explicitly informed that the computer used patterns in 
their choice history against them, so they must be maximally random to win. Using a compressibility 
metric of randomness, our results demonstrate that human RSG can reach levels statistically 
indistinguishable from computer pseudo‑random generators in a competitive‑game setting. 
However, our results also suggest that human RSG cannot be further improved by explicitly informing 
participants that they need to be random to win. In addition, the higher RSG in the game setting does 
not transfer outside the game environment. Furthermore, we found that the underrepresentation of 
long repetitions of the same entry in the series explains up to 29% of the variability in human RSG, and 
we discuss what might make up the variance left unexplained.
It has been debated whether true randomness exists in nature; some have even further claimed that random-
ness cannot be clearly  defined1,2. Nevertheless, characteristics that have been associated with random series 
include equiprobability of terms and sequential  independence1. Formally, for a binary series (si)ni=1 ∈ {0, 1}
n, 
equiprobability means that for any b ∈ {0, 1} , p(si = b) = 0.5—i.e., each item has a 50% chance of being a 0 or a 
1. More generally, equiprobability means that for any b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m− 1}, p(si = b) = 1m ; or, for m items, each 
has a 1m probability of taking each of the m values. Sequential independence—also “memorilessness” or negative 
 recency3—means p(si = b|si−1, . . . , s1) = p(si = b) . In other words, sequential independence means that any 
entry in a series is not influenced by the entries before it (or after it).
Randomness—particularly Random Series Generation (RSG)—is often used in neuroscience and psychology 
to increase cognitive load—e.g., as a distractor task from a main  task4–6. However, research has also been carried 
out specifically on the behavioral, cognitive, and neural underpinnings of RSG in humans. It has thus been shown 
that, when instructed to carry out RSG, humans can generate series that are empirically equiprobable when 
the number of items to randomize is small—e.g., 0’s and 1’s or rock, paper, scissors—though less so for a larger 
number of items—e.g., the digits from 0 to  97. However, regardless of the number of items, they fail to make those 
series sequentially  independent1,8 (see  Tune9 and  Wagenaar10 for reviews of the classic literature on this topic).
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To better understand sequential independence in human RSG, let us first define a run in a series as a sequence 
of the same entry [e.g., the series (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0) is made up of 3 runs: the four consecutive 0’s, the two consecu-
tive 1’s, and the final 0]. Bearing this definition of a run in mind, it has been shown that humans tend to produce 
systematically biased series, switching too often between entries, and thus underrepresenting long runs in their 
generated  series8,11. More generally, it has been shown that humans tend to underrepresent the previous item in 
the series, yet overrepresent items that are 2 and 3 back, regardless of whether they were instructed to vocalize 
or write the items  down12.
That said, there is evidence that, after a lot of training, humans are able to produce series that are more 
sequentially independent; however, that result should be taken with a grain of salt: first those series were not 
empirically equiprobable (over the digits from 0 to 9), second, this was only shown on a single participant, 
who was also the experimenter and thus especially  committed7. It has been further demonstrated that, with 
detailed instructions and when participants can see their generated series, human RSG becomes more sequen-
tially independent and thus more  random8,11. In particular, in a competitive environment with feedback—
e.g., a matching-pennies game—humans exhibit higher sequential independence while apparently maintaining 
empirical  equiprobability2,11. In addition, expert-level players in games where randomness provides a competitive 
advantage have been shown to be more random than novice players during the game, though this randomness 
did not extend to post-game non-competitive  RSG13. However, while human randomness has been shown to be 
context dependent, it has not (to the best of our knowledge) been directly compared to non-human objective 
benchmarks—e.g., to pseudorandom series generation (pseudo-RSG) by computer algorithms.
In the discussion of randomness above, we paid special attention to sequential independence and equiproba-
bility. However, various other characteristics of random sequences have been proposed. In particular, the National 
Institute for Standards and Technology in the US has provided guidance for random sequences (SP800-22) that 
includes 15 different tests of  randomness14 (e.g., complexity tests, spectral tests, compressibility). And it is dif-
ficult to say which, among this multitude of criteria, are the most important characteristics of randomness. This 
is perhaps not surprising given the lack of consensus on how to even define randomness. We therefore decided 
to use a measure of compressibility as our measure of randomness (reminiscent of Maurer’s Universal Statistical 
 Test14) that we term the Lempel–Ziv Complexity (LZC), which is based on a compression algorithm developed 
by Ziv and  Lempel15 (see “Methods”: “Data analyses” for more detail on this algorithm).
The extent of human randomness has implications in various branches of neuroscience, psychology, and 
beyond. In the neuroscience of volition, for example, the ability to act randomly relates to the focus of that field 
on arbitrary choice (a prototypical example is reaching for one carton of milk on a supermarket shelf lined 
with identical ones—same brand, fat content, etc.; a typical experiment in that field may instruct participants 
to randomly raise their left or right hand at the go signal on every trial)16. This focus on arbitrary (or random) 
choice and action follows from the assumption that such arbitrary action, devoid of any reasons or valuation 
of alternatives, reflects the most distilled type of free  choice17–20. And, while this view has been  criticized21–24, it 
remains central in the field. To judge the extent to which participants in such experiments acted randomly, as 
they were instructed, it is important to know how random humans can be. So, in this respect, a person’s maximal 
randomness sets an upper limit on the arbitrariness of their actions in experiments like the above.
Here we aim to integrate three strands of research across multiple disciplines. One pertains to how human 
behavior is shaped by competitive contexts, also studied in economics and game  theory2,11. The second compares 
human RSG to computer pseudo-RSG—i.e., measuring human random behavior in relation to a comparable ran-
dom (but non-human) process. And the third contextualizes the implications human RSG has for understanding 
cognitive processes within multiple fields of psychology related to volition, decision-making, psychopathology, 
and the underlying brain structures that support these processes. More specifically, we aim to answer the fol-
lowing questions. (1) Can human RSG in a game situation be improved when informing people that they must 
be as random as possible to win the game? (2) Is human RSG in a game environment similarly random to the 
pseudo-RSG commonly used in modern programming languages? (3) Is the improved RSG exhibited in a game 
environment transferrable to post-game RSG? (4) To what extent are changes in RSG ability related to changes 
in the length of generated runs?
Methods
Participants. 153 undergraduate students [112 female, age 20.7 ± 2.2  years (mean ± SD)] were recruited 
through the Psychology Department participant pool at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). The 
study was approved by UCLA’s North General Institutional Review Board (NGIRB; IRB#15-001094). All proce-
dures were performed in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Written informed consent was obtained 
from all participants, and all individuals received course credit for participation. Participants were recruited in 
3 batches. After the first batch, we established how many more participants we would need to oversample from 
each condition during the 2nd and 3rd batches to end up with roughly the same number of subjects in the Una-
ware and Aware conditions.
We carried out the power analysis to have enough power to test, using a mixed-effect ANOVA—whether being 
more random during the game would translate into being more random in the post-game RSG and whether 
being or not being aware of the need to be random would affect the degree of randomness (see below). Based on 
previous literature, we assumed a small effect size of 0.2. To obtain a power of 0.8 at a significance level of 0.05, we 
calculated that we would need to collect data from n = 102 participants (assuming no correlation in a repeated-
measures ANOVA). We opted to recruit 50% more participants to be conservative. Our results then showed 
that the effect size in our data was 0.17, slightly less than 0.2. A post-hoc power analysis suggests that n = 141 
participants are needed to obtain a power of 0.8 with a significance level of 0.05 at this effect size. As we were left 
with n = 142 participants after exclusion (see below), our analysis suggests that our results are not underpowered.
3
Vol.:(0123456789)
Scientific Reports |        (2021) 11:20662  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-99967-6
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
Experimental design and procedure. The experiment was designed as a 3× 1 between-participant 
study—with the conditions being (1) Unaware, (2) Aware, and (3) Control. Each experimental session was 
divided into 3 parts, with 200 trials per part, separated into 2 blocks of 100 trials. All participants completed all 
3 parts of the experiment. In each trial, participants selected Rock (R), Paper (P), or Scissors (S) by pressing the 
<G> , <H> , or <B> keys on the keyboard, respectively. In the first—Pre-Game—part of the experiment, partici-
pants were instructed to endogenously generate a sequence of R–P–S that was as random as possible. For the 
second—Game—part of the experiment, participants were told they would be playing R–P–S with the computer 
as their opponent, and their goal was to win as many points as possible. During the game, the computer used 
a specific strategy to either predict or not the participant’s next move, depending on the experimental condi-
tion (see below). In the third and final—Post-Game—part of the experiment, the Pre-Game instructions were 
repeated. An experimental trial is depicted in Fig. 1.
In the Game part only, the participant and the computer started with 100 points each. The winner was the 
player with more points at the end of the Game. Each player gained or lost 1 point for every trial they won or lost, 
respectively. Ties left the score unchanged. Participants were further randomly assigned into one of 3 conditions 
during the Game. In all conditions they were instructed to do their best to win the Game. However, participants 
in the Unaware and Control conditions were told only that—i.e., they knew nothing about the computer’s strategy 
during the Game. Those in the Aware condition were explicitly informed that the computer would try to predict 
their moves and it was stressed that to win they must be as random as possible (Table 1).
In the Unaware and Aware conditions, the computer sought out behavioral patterns in the participant’s choice 
history (e.g., R–R–P–P–S–S–…), their win/lose/tie patterns (e.g., win-stay-lose-switch) and used any patterns 
it could find against them (for details on the Matlab algorithm used  see22,25).  Briefly, the algorithm predicted 
the most likely next play (R, P, or S) given the previous plays and their outcomes (win/loss/tie). The prediction 
was then based on the conditional probabilities of all the possible next moves given the history of moves and 
their outcomes. The next play that the algorithm output was the possibility that followed the most likely pattern, 
or in other words, the one that was least likely by chance (attached Matlab file for the implementation of the 
computer’s playing algorithm).
Given the computer’s playing algorithm, the participant’s best strategy was to be as random as possible, 
minimizing the computer’s ability to find patterns in their choice history. In the Control condition, the computer 
Figure 1.  The progress of each trial in the experiment. Following the countdown, participants were required to 
press the appropriate key for rock, paper, or scissors within 500 ms of the onset of the Go signal; otherwise, the 
trial was forfeit. Their selection was then presented on the screen. In Game trials (on the right), their selection 
was accompanied by the computer’s selection and by the Game score.
Table 1.  Within- and between-participants division of the experiment. Each participant carried out all three 
parts of the experiment (Pre-game, Game, and Post-game). Different participant groups were randomized into 
conditions 1–3 only in the Game part of the experiment.
Pre-game Game Post-game
Random sequence generation
Condition 1, Unaware Computer exploits patterns in participant’s choice history against the participant. Participant 
is not informed of computer’s strategy
Random sequence generationCondition 2, Aware Computer exploits patterns in participant’s choice history against the participant. Participant is explicitly informed of computer’s strategy and told that to win they must be random
Condition 3, Control Computer follows simple pattern continuously with 85% probability on each trial and acts 
randomly with 15% probability. Participant is not informed of computer’s strategy
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followed the pattern R–P–S–R–P–S–… cyclically with 85% probability on each trial, with a remaining 15% chance 
of choosing R, P, or S (with equiprobability) on each trial. At the end of the experiment, the participants were 
then given a post-experiment questionnaire asking them about the task, and their performance in the game (see 
more about the questionnaire below).
Participant‑ and trial‑inclusion criteria. Data exclusion and errors. We identified outlier sequences us-
ing a typical 1.5*IQR (IQR = inter-quartile range) exclusion criterion—i.e., any sample more than 1.5 away from 
the median (Fig. 2). The 16 sequences with LZC scores that were above or below the median ± 1.5*IQR from any 
part of the experiment (not including the Control condition) were identified as outliers (Supplementary Table 1 
contains all the excluded sequences). We did not include sequences from the Control condition in our exclusion 
calculation as sequences generated during the Game in the Control condition were, by design, intended not to 
be random and hence to elicit low-LZC scoring sequences. This was because of the repetitive patterns of the 
series generated by the computer player. This meant that most participants also generated repetitive pattern, 
which they needed to do to win the Game in the control condition. Note that due to the results we obtained, we 
ended up removing the Control condition from the main manuscript, relegating it to the Supplementary instead.
Of the 111 total participants in the Unaware and Aware conditions, 12 (10.8%) generated the 16 sequences 
that met the exclusion criteria above. So, these 12 participants were thus excluded from further analysis accord-
ing to the criterion outlined above (10 were excluded from the Unaware condition, 2 from the Aware condition). 
Another way to exclude participants is by 1.5*IQR distance from the mean—separately for the Unaware and 
Aware conditions. It should be noted that this method results in largely the same participants being excluded 
(the only difference is that Participant #57 is then not excluded from the Unaware condition; see Supplementary 
Table 1).
We expected more exclusions from the Unaware condition because of the experimental setup. It was rather 
difficult to beat the computer. And participants in the Unaware condition had to implicitly learn how to win in 
the Game part, while those in the Aware condition were explicitly told how to beat the computer. We anticipated 
an imbalance in the exclusion numbers between the Unaware and Aware conditions, so we deliberately assigned 
more participants to the Unaware condition during participant randomization. We therefore ended up with 51, 
48, and 42 participants in the Unaware, Aware, and Control conditions, respectively, or 141 participants overall.
On top of participant exclusion, there were also two types of errors that could occur on each trial. (1) The 
participant did not press a key within 500 ms of the Go signal, and (2) the participant pressed a key other 
than <G> , <H> , or <B> . Both errors resulted in a forfeited trial. Further—in the Game part—a point was awarded 
Figure 2.  Visualization of exclusion criteria. Scatter (left) and box (right) plots showing the LZC scores of all 
the sequences in the Unaware and Aware conditions. Sequences more than 1.5*IQR away from the median were 
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to the computer in such cases without a loss of a point for the participant. Both errors were rate. The first occurred 
on 3.1 ± 2.6% of all trials and the second on 0.5 ± 0.8% of all trials (mean ± STD across participants). Those trials 
were removed from further analysis.
Post-experiment questionnaire. Of the 141 participants, who were left after exclusions, 117 (83.0%) answered 
the post-experiment questionnaire. (This is because the questionnaire was introduced only after the first batch 
of participants completed the experiment.) The questionnaire consisted of the following 7 questions. In each of 
them we asked the participants to rate how much they agreed with the following 7 statements, each on a Likert 
scale of 1 to 7 (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree):
(1) Whether they used a strategy against the computer.
(2) Whether they felt that the computer was predicting their moves.
(3) Whether they managed to create very random sequences in part 1 (before the game) and part 3 (after the 
game).
(4) Whether the sequence they created in part 3 was more random than the one they created in part 1.
(5) Whether they won most of the trials during the game.
(6) Whether they tied on most trials during the game.
(7) Whether they lost most of the trials during the game.
Data analyses. Measure of randomness. To quantify the randomness of a given sequence, we used a nor-
malized Lempel–Ziv Complexity (LZC) score, which has been only sparsely used in previous  research26.
This measure of randomness has the added benefit of avoiding narrow definitions relying only on sequen-
tial independence and equiprobability. The LZC score is based on the LZ78 algorithm, which is a variant of a 
dictionary-based, lossless, compression algorithm developed by Ziv and  Lempel15,27. The LZC score is obtained 
by comparing the ratios of the length of a sequence before and after compression with the LZ78 algorithm. 
The algorithm starts with a pre-initialized dictionary of single characters, and then reads in the next character 
of the original sequence until the resulting substring no longer matches any known substring in the diction-
ary. Then, this new substring is appended to the dictionary with a new code consisting of the index of the last 
known substring plus the latest new character. The algorithm thus achieves compression by replacing repeated 
substrings in the original, uncompressed sequences with a shorter code (see attached Python file for the specific 
implementation used in this analysis).
We then normalized the LZC score by generating 1000 pseudorandom sequences of the same length as the 
human generated sequence, and divided the human generated sequence score by the mean LZC score of the 
pseudo-randomly generated  sequences28. This was to remove the effect of small variations in sequence length on 
the raw LZC score, due to the removal of error trials, as a shorter sequence may naturally be less complex than 
a longer sequence due to its length. Thus, a normalized LZC score closer to 1 indicates that a sequence is more 
complex, and thus random, whereas a score closer to 0 indicates that a sequence is less random. As an example, 
take a sequence [3 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 3], which is of length 10. After compressing it with the LZ78 algorithm, the 
sequence is stored as [3 2 1 257 269 2 3] (see Ziv and  Lempel15 for details). The length of this compressed sequence 
is therefore 7 (generally speaking, the LZ78 algorithm tends to result in more dramatic compression for longer 
sequences). To normalize it, we take 1000 pseudorandom sequences of length 10, so perhaps x1 = [1211312221] , 
x2 = [2131121212] , …, x1000 = [3322331233] . Then the normalized LZC score is 7mean(length(lz78(xi))).It is worth noting that we did not use any measures of randomness that directly rely on sequential depend-
ence because, in the Game part for the Unaware and Aware conditions, the computer algorithm relied on this 
measure to play against the participant. Thus, using a similar pattern-matching algorithm to test for randomness 
could amount to double-dipping, as participants were already evaluated against this measure by feedback from 
the algorithm in the Game.
Permutation tests. To compare the randomness scores of the subjects to those generated by the computer 
pseudorandom number generator, we had to first understand the range of the pseudorandom normalized LZC 
scores. We therefore generated 1000 pseudo-random sequences of R–P–S of length 192 (the length of the average 
human sequence).
Then, for each pseudorandom sequence separately, we ran the identical code that we used on the human data 
to compute their randomness scores. This gave us 1000 randomness scores to which we could compare the ran-
domness score that we computed on the human data (see Fig. 3). The pseudo-random sequences were generated 
by Python’s pseudo-random-number generators (using the Mersenne twister algorithm). We then took 5% of the 
randomness scores as the critical threshold ( α level) for LZC scores (see below) to designate significant deviations 
from chance level. The bootstrapped 2.5th to 97.5th percentile of the normalized LZC score distribution was 
[0.973, 1.027] for a sequence length of 192. Thus, for a random sequence as random as Python’s random-number 
generator, a sequence’s normalized LZC score can be expected to fall between 0.973 and 1.027 with a 5% a level 
in a two-tailed test. The theoretical upper limit for an LZC score is 1. However, because the sequences were all 
generated empirically, the upper range of the normalized LZC score can exceed 1 in our calculations, if the 
numerator sequence’s LZC score happened to be larger than the average mean of 1000 sequences other sequences.
Statistical testing. We used null-hypothesis statistical testing (NHST) as well as Bayesian hypothesis testing for 
our statistical testing. Generally speaking, NHST enables the researcher only to reject  H0 given a low-enough p 
value (that p value indicating the probability that we would have found our data or more extreme data if  H0 was 
correct), then stating that there is a statistically significant difference between some conditions (as per  H1). In 
6
Vol:.(1234567890)
Scientific Reports |        (2021) 11:20662  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-99967-6
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
contrast, Bayesian analyses—and the Bayes factor  (BF10) in particular—deal with the amount of evidence favor-
ing  H1 (i.e., that the conditions are different) versus  H0 (i.e., that the conditions are the same). Hence, Bayesian 
analysis can conclude that the evidence supports  H1, supports  H0, or is inconclusive. Following  Rouder29, we 
took a  BF10 odds ratio between 3 and 10 as reflecting “some evidence,” between 10 and 30 as “strong evidence,” 
and greater than 30 as “very strong evidence” for  H1 over  H0. The reciprocals (i.e., one over 3, 10, and 30) would 
be respectively taken as corresponding evidence for  H0 over  H1. Finally, 1/3 <  BF10 < 3 is taken as inconclusive 
evidence for either  H1 or  Ho. All our Bayesian analyses were conducted using the JASP software  package30–32.
Bayesian analysis requires us to make assumptions about the prior distribution of the parameter in which 
we are interested, which affects the  BF10 we get. However, we found no literature on priors to use in Bayesian 
statistical tests for RSG. We therefore opted to use JASP’s default prior: the Cauchy distribution with a scale/
parameter of 0.707. First, selecting a prior in advance guards against cherry picking a prior that supports gaining 
evidence for one’s favored hypothesis. Second, we often use Bayesian inference here to seek evidence for  H0. And 
using other, wider priors results in lower  BF10—indicating stronger evidence in favor of H0. So, results favoring 
 H0 based on this default prior are thus relatively robust to change of priors.
Explanatory variable: average run length. We also computed an explanatory statistic called the run-length—the 
mean length of a run in a series. For instance, the run-length of the sequence R–R–R–P–P–S–P–P is the mean 
of the lengths of all the runs—3, 2, 1, 2—which is 2. The run-length is related to the randomness of a sequence 
in that the longer the run-length of a sequence is, the fewer runs there will be for a sequence of fixed length. 
We bootstrapped this measure, similarly to the randomness scores above, to obtain an empirical distribution of 
mean run-lengths. The 2.5th to 97.5th percentile range was [1.363, 1.658]. For a perfectly sequentially independ-
ent sequence of 3 items, the ideal run-length is 1.5.
Results
R–P–S game results (manipulation check). Three of our four research questions relate directly to the 
degree of randomness that our participants could achieve during the Game part in the Unaware and Aware 
conditions. Yet the participants were to be driven to relatively high randomness by striving to beat a computer 
algorithm that used patterns in their behavior against them. In contrast, the Control condition was developed to 
make subjects play the game while not acting randomly (see “Methods”). We therefore wanted to test that our 
participants struggled against the computer in the Unaware and Aware conditions and did relatively well in the 
Control condition.
Figure 3.  LZC scores of human generated sequences. Violin plots of LZC scores by experimental part and 
condition are shown with the mean and 95% confidence intervals superimposed in black are shown on the 
left. The empirical distribution of 1000 bootstrapped pseudo-random sequences is given on the right. The 
horizontal, solid red lines—on the left and right—indicate the mean LZC score at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile 
(bottom and top, respectively) of 1000 bootstrapped, computer-generated pseudo-random sequences. Values 
between these lines are statistically indistinguishable from the computer-generated pseudo-random sequence 
distribution. (See Supplementary Fig. 2 for all LZC scores, including the Control condition).
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We therefore analyzed the final game scores in the 3 conditions: Unaware 75.78 ± 17.63, Aware 78.83 ± 16.06, 
Control 140.10 ± 51.05 (mean ± STD). This suggest that our manipulation worked well. Participants found it 
difficult to beat the computer in both the Aware and Unaware, where the winning strategy required them to be 
random. On the other hand, participants in the Control condition, where the winning strategy was to almost 
always follow the simple, cyclic P-S-R pattern, found it easy to win (Supplementary Fig. 1).
Overall, the experimental manipulation created a large difference (in terms of effect  size33) between condi-
tions. After exclusions (see “Methods”), 3 out of 51 (5.88%), 4 out of 48 (8.33%), and 31 of 42 (73.81%) partici-
pants beat the computer in the Unaware, Aware, and Control conditions, respectively. Per our design, participants 
were much more likely to lose to the computer in the Unaware and Aware conditions, than under the Control 
condition using NHST; but there were no statistically significant differences between the Unaware and Aware 
conditions. In other words, instructing the participants that they needed to be as random as possible to beat the 
computer in the Aware condition resulted in no statistically significant increase in the number of participants 
who were able to beat the computer in comparison to the Unaware condition (ANOVA with Welch correction 
for homogeneity, F(2, 79.52) = 30.43, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.46 ; post-hoc t-test comparison with Bonferroni correction 
for Unaware vs Aware, t(97) = − 0.49, p = 1.0, Cohen’s d = − 0.18, 95% CI [− 17.92, 11.83]. The Bonferroni is a 
conservative correction for multiple comparisons that is most commonly used, and thus enables easy comparison 
with other literature.) The consistent differences (i.e., the significant p-value in the main effect of the ANOVA) 
were due to the differences between the Control condition and the experimental conditions (post-hoc t-test 
Unaware vs Control: t(91) = − 9.89, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = − 1.75, 95% CI [− 79.72, − 48.90]; Aware vs Control: 
t(88) = − 9.28, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = − 1.67, 95% CI [− 76.89, − 45.63]).
Using a Bayesian analysis, we corroborated the above and found very strong evidence that a larger number 
of participants won during the Control condition in comparison to the other two experimental conditions. 
Importantly, this analysis also provided some evidence that the Unaware and Aware conditions were the same. 
(Bayesian ANOVA specifying a multivariate Cauchy prior on the effects; the model with condition as an effect 
best represented the data over the null model with no effects,  BF10 = 2.12 ×  1016. Post-hoc Bayesian t-tests for 
Unaware vs Control had a  BF10 = 1.09 ×  1010, and for Aware vs Control,  BF10 = 8.12 ×  108. Post-hoc comparison 
corrected for multiple testing between the Unaware and Aware conditions:  BF10 = 0.30).
Measuring and comparing randomness. We measured the randomness of the series that our subjects 
generated using LZC scores (see “Methods”). The distributions of the LZC scores for each condition and part of 
the experiment are shown as violin plots in Fig. 3 (see also Supplementary Table 2 for full descriptive statistics).
Can human RSG in a game situation be improved when informing people that they must be as 
random as possible to win the game? As per the research question, from the onset we were interested 
in whether the degree of randomness was similar or different between the Game parts of the Aware and Una-
ware conditions (Fig. 3, left). We therefore carried out a planned comparison directly between the normalized 
LZC scores in the Game part of the Aware and Unaware groups. An NHST comparison between the two groups 
indicated that there was no significant difference between the randomness scores (unpaired t-test t(97) = − 0.78, 
p = 0.43, Cohen’s d = − 0.16).
We then wanted to further investigate whether there was evidence that the randomness in the Aware and 
Unaware conditions was the same. We thus ran a Bayesian t-test between the normalized LZC scores in the 
Aware and Unaware conditions and found some evidence that our participants were equally random in the two 
conditions  (BF10 = 0.28).
Is human RSG in a game environment similarly random to the pseudo‑RSG commonly used 
in modern programming languages? We wanted to test how similar human RSG is to the pseudo-RSG 
that is generated in modern programming languages. We therefore used a permutation test to compare Python’s 
RSG to the RSG of our participants (see “Methods”). We found that—in the Game part only, and during the 
Aware and Unaware conditions only—the mean normalized LZC scores were above the 2.5 percentile of com-
puter-generated bootstrapped distribution (Fig. 3, right; note that, as this is a permutation test, just the mean of 
those scores, and not their mean ± 95% CI, needs to be above the 2.5 percentile of the bootstrapped distribution). 
So, the LZC scores in the Game part during the Aware and Unaware conditions are statistically indistinguishable 
from those of Python’s random-number generator.
Is the improved RSG exhibited in a game environment transferrable to a post‑game environ‑
ment? Following previous literature, we expected participants to display higher randomness during the 
Game part in comparison to the Pre-Game and Post-Game parts in both the Aware and Unaware conditions. 
However, we wanted to know whether subjects were able to maintain the higher randomness that they achieved 
during the Game part in the Post-Game RSG. As expected from previous literature, we found significantly 
higher normalized LZC scores during the Game parts in both conditions. But it did not seem that subjects 
were able to maintain this higher level of randomness in the Post-Game part of the experiment in both con-
ditions (Fig. 3). Participants’ level of randomness in the Pre- and Post-Game parts were consistently smaller 
than during the Game part but not consistently different from each other (repeated measures ANOVAs with a 
between-subjects factor (condition: Unaware, Aware) and within-subjects factor (Experiment part: Pre-Game, 
Game, Post-Game) to compare the LZC scores across conditions and across experiment parts, (F(2,194) = 19.81, 
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.17 ). Post-hoc paired t-tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparison revealed that 
participants were significantly more random during the Game than in the Pre-Game or Post-Game. (Pre-Game 
vs. Game: t(97) = − 6.1, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = − 0.61, 95% CI [− 0.03, − 0.01]; Game vs. Post-game: t(97) = 4.47, 
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p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.45, 95% CI [0.01, 0.03]). The Pre-Game level of randomness, however, was not signifi-
cantly lower than the Post-Game (Pre-Game vs. Post-Game: t(97) = − 1.60, p = 0.11, Cohen’s d = − 0.16, 95% CI 
[− 0.014, 0.003]).
A Bayesian analysis corroborated the NHST results, providing very strong evidence for higher randomness 
during the Game part compared to the other parts in both the Aware and Unaware conditions (Bayesian repeated-
measures ANOVA model (specifying a multivariate Cauchy prior on the effects), with the experiment part only 
as a factor versus the null model with no effects using JASP:  BF10 = 1.29 ×  106, which is very strong evidence for 
this model over the null model. There was also very strong evidence in favor of the model with the experiment 
part and condition both as factors over the null model  (BF10 = 1.06 ×  106) as well as for the model with both 
factors (experiment part and condition) including an interaction term between the factors  (BF10 = 1.04 ×  105). 
However, the Bayesian analysis did not provide conclusive evidence that the Aware and Unaware conditions were 
the same or different (post-hoc comparisons for Unaware vs. Aware:  BF10 = 1.19). In sum, we found very strong 
evidence that participants were more random during the Game part than the Pre- and Post-Game conditions 
but no evidence that the Pre- and Post-Game parts were different (though we found no evidence that they were 
similar either).
In addition, there was no consistent difference between the levels of randomness in the Aware and Unaware 
conditions (overall post-hoc paired t-test with Bonferroni correction between the Aware and Unaware conditions 
showed no significant difference (t(79) = − 1.82, p = 0.07, Cohen’s d = − 0.18, 95% CI [− 0.02, 0.006]). A Bayesian 
analysis did not find conclusive evidence for consistent similarity between the two experimental parts, though 
the evidence was trending toward the same randomness in both parts (post-hoc Bayesian t-test corrected for 
multiple comparisons between the Pre-Game and Post-Game parts:  BF10 = 0.39).
On top of the aggregate analysis above, we also tested LZC scores on a subject-by-subject basis. In the Una-
ware condition, 35 of the 51 participants, 68.63%, were more random (according to their LZC scores) during the 
Game than during both Pre- and Post-Game, which is significantly more than expected by chance (binomial test 
p < 0.001; chance level is 25%). Similarly, in the Aware condition, 25 of the 48 participants, 52.08%, were more 
random during the Game than in both Pre- and Post-Game, again more than expected by chance (binomial 
test p < 0.001). Hence, both the average and individual LZC scores suggest a pattern of participants being more 
random in the Game compared to the Pre-Game and Post-Game for the Aware and Unaware conditions.
To further test whether participants had different Pre- and Post-Game LZC scores, we ran a subject-by-
subject analysis. In the Unaware condition, we found that 32 out of 51 participants had a lower LZC score in the 
Pre-Game than in the Post-Game (binomial test, p = 0.16), which was not significantly more than expected by 
chance. In the Aware condition, 26 out of 48 participants had a lower LZC score in the Pre-Game than in the 
Post-Game (binomial test, p = 0.89), which was not significantly more than expected by chance. Therefore, we 
find that the pattern of individual LZC scores also provided no evidence for a difference between Pre-Game and 
Post-Game randomness.
As the LZC did not remain higher after the Game into the Post-Game RSG, the Control condition that we 
developed to specifically control for that became less important. We therefore relegated the figures that included 
the Control condition (Supplementary Figs. 2 and 3) and the statistical analysis of the information within those 
figures to the Supplementary Material.
To what extent are changes in RSG ability related to changes in the length of generated 
runs? It is known that humans underrepresent long runs when carrying out RSG. Investigating further why 
participants’ LZC scores varied in the above pattern, we therefore looked at the length of the runs that the par-
ticipants were creating, comparing the average run-lengths of participants’ sequences across conditions and 
Game parts (Fig. 4).
The pattern of the run-length results mirrored that of the LZC scores only to a certain extent (see Supple-
mentary Table 3 for full descriptive statistics). This time, participants produced significantly longer average run 
lengths during the Game and Post-Game parts in comparison to the Pre-Game (Repeated-measures ANOVA 
with Greenhouse–Geisser correction for sphericity comparing the Unaware and Aware conditions, average run-
lengths across the experiment parts were significantly different (F(1.8,174) = 20.84, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.18 ; post-hoc 
paired t-tests with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons: Pre-Game vs. Game: t(97) = − 5.87, p < 0.001, 
Cohen’s d = − 0.59, 95% CI [− 0.17, − 0.07]; Game vs. Post-Game: t(97) = 0.62, p = 1, Cohen’s d = 0.06, 95% CI 
[− 0.04, 0.06]; Pre-Game vs. Post-Game: t(97) = − 5.26, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = − 0.53, 95% CI [− 0.16, − 0.06]). We 
also found no significant effect of condition (overall post-hoc paired t-tests with Bonferroni correction: Unaware 
vs. Aware, t(97) = − 0.89, p = 0.38, Cohen’s d = − 0.09, 95% CI [− 0.09, 0.04]).
Bayesian analysis corroborated the NHST results, providing very strong evidence for longer run-length 
during the Game and Post-Game parts in comparison to the Pre-Game, in both the Aware and Unaware condi-
tions (Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA model—specifying a multivariate Cauchy prior on the effects—
determined that the data were best represented by a model that included experiment part only, as a factor 
 (BF10 = 2.2 ×  106), compared to the null model. Post hoc Bayesian t-tests (controlled for multiplicity): Pre-Game 
vs Game  BF10 = 1.47 ×  107, Pre-Game vs Post-Game  BF10 = 31,444.42).
In contrast to the above evidence for differences in run length between some experiment parts, we found 
some evidence for the same average run length between the Game and Post-Game parts (post hoc Bayesian t 
test:  BF10 = 0.13). We also found some evidence that there was no difference in average run length between the 
Unaware and Aware conditions (post hoc Bayesian t test:  BF10 = 0.25).
This trend also held for individual participants. In the Unaware condition, 32 of the 51 participants, 62.75%, 
had longer runs during the Game than during both Pre- and Post-Game, which is significantly more than 
expected by chance (binomial test p < 0.001). For the Aware condition, 23 of the 48 participants, 47.92%, had 
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longer runs during the game than during both Pre-Game and Post-Game, which is once more significantly more 
than expected by chance (binomial test p = 0.002). Note that these proportions of participants with longer runs 
during the Game in comparison to the other 2 experiment parts were not significantly different between the 
Unaware and Aware conditions ( χ2 test: χ2=0.63, p = 0.43).
We wanted to understand the extent to which the variance in randomness might be explained by the run 
length. We therefore regressed each sequence’s average runs-length onto its corresponding LZC score. We found 
a significant correlation between the two overall and for each experiment part separately. Overall, using simple 
OLS regressions, the run length explained almost a fifth of the variance in randomness across all experiment 
parts and conditions combined  (R2 = 0.19, p < 0.001; see Supplementary Fig. 4 for details). It also explained more 
than a quarter of the variance in the Pre-Game  (R2 = 0.27, p < 0.001; see Supplementary Fig. 5 for details) almost 
three tenths of the variance in the Game  (R2 = 0.29, p < 0.001; see Supplementary Fig. 6 for details) and a tenth 
of the variance in the Post-Game  (R2 = 0.1, p < 0.001; see Supplementary Fig. 7 for details).
Questionnaire answers. As part of the post-experiment questionnaire, 117 of our participants reported 
whether they used a strategy against the computer in the game (n = 44 for unaware, n = 34 for aware n = 39 for 
control). We thus tested whether there was a difference between their responses in the Aware and Unaware sub-
ject groups. Subjects’ median rating was 4 out of 7 (IQR = 2.75–5) for Unaware, and 4 out of 7 (IQR = 1.25–5) for 
Aware, and 6 out of 7 (IQR = 4.5–7) for Control.
The mean ratings for the Unaware was 3.71 ± 1.67, 3.53 ± 1.89 for Aware, and 5.28 ± 1.97, for Control 
(mean ± STD). Hence, the Aware and Unaware conditions were both reliably different from the control but 
not from each other (ANOVA F(2, 114) = 10.44, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.16 . Post-hoc independent t-tests: Unaware vs 
Aware t(76) = 0.41, p = 1; Unaware vs Control t(681) = − 3.87, p < 0.001; Aware vs Control t(71) = − 4.03, p < 0.001.
As the Likert items give ordinal data, we also tested group differences with the Kruskal–Wallis Test. We 
found an overall significant difference of condition (H(2) = 19.54, p < 0.001). Dunn’s Post-hoc comparisons with 
Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons showed that Unaware vs. Aware was not significantly different 
from each other (p = 1), while Unaware vs. Control and Aware vs. Control were significantly different (p < 0.001).
In a similar manner, we tested whether subjects’ perceptions of being predicted by the computer differed 
between the Aware and Unaware condition. Subjects’ median rating was 5 (IQR = 2.75–6) for Unaware, 5 
((IQR = 4–6) for Aware, and 4 (IQR = 2–5.5) for Control. The mean ratings were 4.36 ± 2 (Unaware, mean ± STD), 
4.65 ± 1.82 (Aware), and 3.67 ± 2.16 (Control), which were not significantly different between conditions (ANOVA 
F(2, 114) = 2.37, p = 0.098, η2p = 0.04. Kruskal–Wallis Test H(2) = 4.25, p = 0.12).
We also tested whether participants’ perception of their improved ability to generate randomness after the 
Game correlated with their actual improvement in randomness as measured by their LZC score. The correla-
tion between their answer to questionnaire question 4 (whether the sequence they created Post-Game was more 
random than the one they created Pre-Game) and the difference in LZC score between the Post-Game and Pre-
Game sequences was small and not statistically significant (Pearson’s R = − 0.11, p = 0.26. Spearman’s rho = − 0.11, 
p = 0.24). Similarly, we tested the correlation between the LZC score difference and ratings of question 3 (whether 
Figure 4.  Average run-length scores of human generated sequences. Average run-length scores by experimental 
part and condition are indicated below each violin plot and in black inside each violin plot with 95% CI. The 
horizontal red line indicates the mean run-length of the 2.5th percentile of 1000 bootstrapped pseudo-random 
sequences. (See Supplementary Fig. 3 for all LZC scores, including the Control condition).
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they managed to create very random sequences in Pre-Game and Post-Game). Again, the correlation was very 
small and not significant (Pearson’s R = − 0.02, p = 0.82. Spearman’s rho = − 0.06, p = 0.52).
Gender. Because our sample was imbalanced with regards to gender (after exclusions, we were left with 101 
female vs. 40 male participants over all conditions), we conducted an analysis to see whether our results differed 
by gender (see Supplementary Table 4 for full descriptive statistics). To verify this, we ran a repeated measures 
ANOVA with two between-subjects factor (condition: unaware, Aware; gender: male, female) and a within-
subjects factor (experiment part: pre-Game, Game, Post-Game). We did not find significant differences in LZC 
scores by gender (F(1,95) = 0.275, p = 0.60, η2p = 0.003 .) and even found some evidence that there is no difference 
between males and females with a Bayesian analysis  (BF10 = 0.21). So, we conclude that the gender imbalance is 
unlikely to significantly bias our results.
Discussion
Multiple researchers (e.g.,  Wagenaar10, Mookherjee and  Sopher34, Nickerson and  Butler8,  Rappaport2,11) have 
previously demonstrated that humans are unable to generate highly random sequences. That said, previous litera-
ture has also demonstrated that humans are able to be more random in competitive situations with  feedback2,11. 
Building on that, we set out to examine four research questions. First, we tested the extent to which human RSG 
in a competitive game situation depended on whether the subjects were specifically informed that they must 
be as random as possible to win the game. We found some evidence that the degree of randomness when our 
participants were aware versus unaware that they must be as random as possible to win was the same. So, in 
other words, simply informing subjects that they must be as random as possible did not make them any more 
(or less) random.
Other factors could have naturally contributed to this similar degree of randomness between the Unaware 
and Aware groups. For example, Hyman and  Jenkin35 demonstrated for a similar task that subjects’ motivation to 
succeed and their belief in their ability to succeed in the task contribute to their performance. Our participants 
may have lacked incentives to be particularly motivated to win in the game context, as their performance was not 
related to any compensation, or even to an overall competition among the participants for points, unlike other 
 studies11. Participants in the Aware and Unaware groups might have also believed that the computer’s prediction 
algorithm works well and that they were unlikely to be able to beat it.
Interestingly, the post-experiment questionnaire suggests subjects reported similar levels of confidence that 
they used a strategy against the computer in the Aware and Unaware conditions. Hence, being made aware that 
they needed to be random to beat the computer did not make subjects more likely to use a conscious strategy 
against the computer than when they were unaware that they needed to be random. Similarly, we found no 
difference in subjects’ perceptions of how much the computer predicted them between the Aware and Una-
ware conditions. In both cases they felt slightly predicted. So, again, being made aware that the computer was 
predicting them did not make subjects feel more predicted by the computer. Furthermore, the post-experiment 
questionnaire confirmed that participants’ perception of the randomness of their sequences had very little cor-
relation with the actual randomness of those sequences. Together, these results support previous findings that 
RSG seems decorrelated from  consciousness13 and suggest that it may be an automatic, involuntary process.
Studies in animal models have shown that a competitive setting triggers strategic counterprediction, rather 
than stochastic behavior, even when acting as random as possible maximizes  reward36–38. Perhaps participants 
cannot help but try to predict the computer’s next actions, before attempting to be as unpredictable as possible 
themselves, even when they have been informed that the latter is the optimal strategy. This automatic counter-
prediction can also explain why Morra players did not exhibit better randomization in the game  setting13, where 
counterprediction is just as important as stochastic unpredictability to win.
Intriguingly, the neural underpinnings of RSG in a competitive setting differ between animal and human 
models: in animals, the nodes which are recruited during strategic rule-building, most notably the anterior cin-
gulate cortex (ACC), become decorrelated during stochastic  behavior36. In humans, on the contrary, ACC activa-
tion covaries positively with randomization  performance39, suggesting that humans use a different mechanism 
to produce random sequences. Moreover, it seems that a widespread, inter-connected recruitment of various 
regions is needed to produce more random  sequences40, much like the organization thought to support conscious 
access to  stimuli41. This seems opposed to the various findings of decorrelation between RSG and conscious-
ness but may be explained by a need to fully recruit one’s conscious attention onto the task itself; this may then 
not leave any resources for becoming conscious of the specific mechanisms used to produce a sequence that is 
as random as possible. It may also be what makes the difference between humans and rodents in terms of RSG 
neural mechanisms.
Our second research question was how random can people be in a competitive game environment? We 
found, as far as we know for the first time, that human RSG in this environment was on average statistically 
indistinguishable from pseudo-RSG algorithms commonly used in modern programming languages. This was 
the case at least when participants had to be as random as possible to win (i.e., in the Unaware and Aware condi-
tions, but not in the Control condition). So, combined with the first research question, our results suggest that 
human RSG in a game cannot be further improved, beyond its high level, by explicitly telling participants that 
they need to be random to win.
That said, the extent to which computer pseudo-RSG algorithms are random is debatable. (Python’s default 
pseudo-random generator relies on the Mersenne twister algorithm—the same goes for Matlab, Stata, Ruby, 
R, Julia, Scilab, SageMath, etc.—which passes the Diehard tests of randomness and the Small Crush battery 
of the newer TestU01 collection, but fails on the more extensive Crush and Big Crush battery of the TestU01 
 collection42–44;  (TestU0145 is a software library used to benchmark and test the performance of uniform random 
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number generators. It consists of 3 predefined batteries of statistical tests named “Small Crush” (containing 10 
tests, e.g., Marsaglia’s birthday spacings test, Knuth’s simple poker test) “Crush” (96 tests), and “Big Crush” (106 
tests) in increasing order of stringency and runtime.). Our results are nevertheless interesting and set a higher 
benchmark for the ability of humans to be random than was previously known.
We previously hypothesized that the similarity between the levels of randomness in the Unaware and Aware 
conditions during this Game part stemmed from subject’s lack of motivation. However, the high level of random-
ness that we found during the Game part—statistically indistinguishable from modern, algorithmic RSG—casts 
serious doubt on that hypothesis.
Third, we were wondering whether the improved RSG exhibited in a competitive game environment would 
transfer to a post-game environment—i.e., are people more random after the game than they were before the 
game? We did not find evidence for such a transfer of human RSG ability when looking at the LZC score. Put 
differently, we found no evidence that subjects were able to maintain the higher degree of randomness that they 
exhibited during the Game also Post-Game. We also asked them explicitly about their RSG ability Pre- and Post-
Game. And we found that, at the group level at least, participants were generally not able to perceive when they 
were more or less random Post-Game. Thus, it appears that participants were able to transfer neither the implicit 
nor the explicit randomness that they exhibited during the Game to their RSG after the game. One potential 
explanation for this effect may be that being random is a costly, effortful task, which requires a lot of cognitive 
resources, and can thus only be achieved under the higher motivational state when playing a game.
Last,  Nickerson1,8 and colleagues have shown that humans underrepresent long runs of short sequences during 
RSG—i.e., that humans over alternate between items in the series—and this is one reason for the limited human 
RSG ability. We therefore wanted to test whether changes in RSG ability were related to changes in the length 
of generated runs. We found that the run-length explained between 10 and 29% of the variance in participants’ 
degree of randomness. Therefore, average run-length by itself is apparently far from sufficient to characterize 
randomness as measured by the LZC.
What is more, while Post-Game LZC scores dropped back to Pre-Game levels, the average run-length did not 
drop down from the Game level in the Post-Game. In addition, run-length explained only 1/10 of the variance in 
the Post-Game RSG, which is much lower than the amount of variance that it explained during the Pre-Game and 
Game parts. This suggests that participants managed to learn to make longer runs in the Post-Game—as long as 
in the Game—but their sequences nevertheless ended up being roughly as random as those in the Pre-Game. This 
might be because the run-length measure tracks only the repetition of unigrams (i.e., single entries in the series), 
whereas the LZC is sensitive to repetition of n-grams for any n ≥ 1 . Thus, previous research which characterized 
human RSG with measures of randomness less sensitive to n-grams than the LZC may have missed post-game 
transfer effects relating to a return to higher-order pattern frequency (i.e., repetition of larger n-grams post-game).
Following the above, it would be interesting to investigate what factors make up the remaining 70–90% of the 
variability in human randomness that was left unexplained by run length. For example, giving instructions in a 
more intuitive manner, or using a different method of eliciting random sequences may reveal different results. 
 Wagenaar10 hypothesized a difference between verbal instruction and visual display of potential entries in the 
random sequence which could affect random sequence generation. Ayton et al.46 further suggests that some 
of the observed non-randomness may come from instructional bias from the experiment, by giving explicitly 
prohibited examples of unlikely or unacceptable sequences (e.g., telling participants that the sequence “ABC” 
or meaningful words are unlikely when drawing letters randomly). Though Beach and  Swensson47 showed that 
specific instructions related to the gambler’s fallacy—e.g., telling subjects to ignore run dependency—do not 
help lengthen participants’ run lengths. They suggest that the method of eliciting random sequences may instead 
be more important. This is in line with the results of Peterson and  Ulehla48, who had participants take part in 
a probability learning task and found that they did better when they had to learn the probabilities in a series 
formed by them throwing dice than by them picking stacked cards (even though the stacked cards were ordered 
according to another participant’s dice throws).
Regardless of the above, it remains unclear what factors make our participants more random in the competi-
tive game environment compared to the post-game. There are at least two differences between the Game and 
Post-Game trials: the competitive nature and the feedback in the former. A future study could test whether post-
game randomness changes after a non-competitive game with constant feedback on one’s level of randomness 
(e.g., via a continuously updated runs-test score), potentially teasing apart the effect of feedback from compe-
tition. Competition and feedback could also increase motivation, which might further explain the difference 
in randomness (e.g., through the mechanism of attention). So, it would be good to test whether introducing a 
monetary reward above a certain randomness threshold, for example, could improve randomness (Hyman and 
 Jenkin35 suggest it may). In addition, explicitly informing participants that randomness during a game is higher 
than during pre-game might make them realize that they do better during the game and facilitate transferring 
their increased randomness to the post-game environment.
Recent results suggest that individual RSG ability could potentially be like a fingerprint—a unique biomarker 
of  cognition49–51. RSG ability also appears to vary amongst different psychopathological  populations52–54. It 
appears, from our results, among others, that humans cannot easily and consciously modulate their random-
ness at will. This might explain the randomness-as-a-biomarker phenomenon, and it might also provide sup-
port for the use of RSG as a clinical diagnostic tool. For example, if RSG is driven by momentary neural noise, 
these noise patterns might be individual specific, or they could be modulated by some diseases. If so, it would 
be interesting to test whether these individual RSG patterns generalize from self-paced to competitive game 
environments and vice versa.
It may further be of interest to go beyond our behavioral results toward a neural model of randomness. In 
this respect, our results may relate to the “Network-Modulation Model” for randomness proposed by Jahanshahi 
and colleagues. The model suggests that the superior temporal cortex (STC) is involved in stereotyped responses 
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(such as ordered counting) and that suppression of these habitual responses is necessary for RSG. Further, 
according to the model, this suppression is achieved via the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which 
exerts an inhibitory influence on the STC. The model was constructed based on evidence from positron emission 
tomography, transcranial magnetic stimulation, and lesion  studies55–57. This model more recently gained support 
from electroencephalography studies as  well58,59. However, if DLPFC activity can be upregulated to exert enough 
inhibitory influence on the STC during Game trials, why was this ability not transferred to the Post-Game trials 
of our experiment? Note that our task instructions informed subjects that the Post-Game RSG would follow the 
Game part. One possibility is that something in the game environment triggered the DLPFC’s inhibitory influ-
ence on the STC to create more-random sequences; however, even though participants were instructed to be as 
random as possible in the Post-Game RSG, and thus likely attempted to do so consciously and voluntarily, the 
DLPFC did not exert the same level of inhibition on the STC in the post-game part. If DLPFC activity could be 
brought under more voluntary control—e.g., via  neurofeedback60—would up- or down-regulating left DLPFC 
activity then increase or decrease participants’ level of randomness, respectively? It would be interesting to test 
these speculations empirically as part of a future neuroscientific study. In particular, a neuroimaging version of 
our task could test whether the higher degree of randomness during a game correlates with stronger inhibition 
of the STC by the DLPFC, or whether other circuits also alter their activity, thereby increasing DLPFC activity 
or decreasing STC activity, in accordance with the Network-Modulation Model.
On top of the more general relation to neuroscience, our results more specifically relate to the neuroscience 
of volition. For example, our finding that RSG in a competitive environment might be as random as a computer’s 
pseudo-RSG mean that the upper limit on the arbitrariness of human action could be higher than previously 
realized—at least in a competitive game environment. In addition, previous work has demonstrated the existence 
of biases that may affect decisions, especially when the decision alternatives are of similar  value22. Interestingly, 
those biases were found in the DLPFC, which has also been implicated in RSG. It would therefore be interesting 
to investigate the extent to which biases in decision making and RSG are supported by the same neural mecha-
nisms, which may involve the DLPFC.
Several potential limitations of our study should be mentioned. One stems from its gender imbalance. We 
found no evidence for gender differences in RSG generation in the literature. And we found evidence that there 
are no differences in RSG ability between males and females in our dataset. Nevertheless, our participants were 
73% female and this roughly 3:1 gender imbalance might still have some effect on our results. Future research 
with a large-enough dataset that is roughly gender balanced might dispel this concern.
Another limitation of our study was our inability to account for the great majority of the variance in the LZC 
measure using other factors that we measured; less than 1/3 of the LZC variance was explained by the run-length 
scores. What is more, the relation between the LZC score and run length may be more complex than simply 
linear. Future research could track other factors, beyond run length, that would enable a better characterization 
of the variance in the LZC score. Finally, our data were collected on the Rock–Paper–Scissors game and RSG. 
It is unknown to what degree our results would generalize to games with more or less choice items, as well as 
perhaps to more complex games.
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